Abstract: This paper purports to examine the validity of the common belief that in a developing economy the backward agricultural sector should be subsidized as poorer group of the working population are employed in this sector that send their children out to work out of sheer poverty. A three-sector general equilibrium framework with agricultural dualism and child labour has been employed for the purpose of analysis. It finds that a price subsidy policy to backward agricultural sector is likely to aggravate the child labour incidence while a credit subsidy to advanced agriculture may be effective in reducing the gravity of the problem in the economy. The paper, therefore, questions the desirability of assisting backward agriculture for eradicating child labour in the society.
Introduction
The incidence of child labour is one of the most disconcerting problems in the transitional societies of developing economies. According to ILO (2002) , one in every six children aged between 5 and 17 -or 246 million children are involved in child labour.
1 If the "invisible"
workers who perform unpaid and household jobs are included, it is likely that the estimates would shoot up significantly further.
Available empirical evidences suggest that the concentration of child labour is the highest in the rural sector of a developing economy and that child labour is used intensively directly or indirectly in the agricultural sector 2 . In backward agriculture, the production techniques are primitive, use of capital is very low and child labour can almost do whatever adult labour does.
Farming in backward agriculture is mostly done by using bullocks and ploughs and the cattlefeeding is entirely done by child labour. Besides, at the time of sowing of seeds and harvest children are often used in the family farms for helping adult members of the family. The advanced agricultural sector on the other hand uses mechanised techniques of production and uses agricultural machineries like tractors, seeders/planters, sprayers and harvesters etc. and therefore does not require child labour in its production process. This type of agricultural dualism is a very common feature of the developing countries. The distinction between advanced and backward agriculture can be made on the basis of inputs used, economies of scale, efficiency and elasticity of substitution. Many of the farmers in the agricultural sector of a developing economy stick to old and unscientific methods of cultivation although in other parts of the economy the introduction of the so called 'Green Revolution' technology brought about revo lutionary changes with respect to production technologies and use of modern inputs and the increase in factor productivity. However, the improved technology was designed for the best areas (irrigation, high 1 Out of 246 million about 170 million child workers were found in different hazardous works.
Some 8.4 million children were caught in the worst forms of child labour includin g slavery, trafficking, debt bondage and other forms of forced labour, forced recruitment for armed conflict, prostitution, pornography and other illicit activities (ILO, June 2002) .
soil fertility) with chemical-intensive technology. Although, Green Revolution has modernized agricultural technology, it is limited only to a few parts of a developing economy and only rich (large) farmers have been benefited from it. The small and marginal farmers continue to depend on rain-fed backward agricultural technique. Therefore, the adoption of the Green Revolution technology has led to an increase in the extent of agricultural dualism in a developing economy.
The existing theoretical literature on child labour 3 , however, has not paid any attention so far to this kind of agricultural dualism and its implications on the problem of child labour. This is important because from the view point of the use of child labour, these two types of agricultural sectors differ and any changes in their output composition will affect the magnitude of child labour use in the agricultural sector. Agriculture in many countries is supported by government's subsidy policies in the form of price support, export subsidy and credit support etc. In a developing country like India, farmers in backward agriculture are given price support to protect them from sharp fall in their produce during the times of over supply in the market.
Government's Minimum Support Price mechanism is a very common form of government subsidy policy directed towards backward agriculture to ensure remunerative prices to farmers.
Government also provides subsidised credit to encourage mechanised farming and increase productivity. Institutional credit at a subsidised rate is being provided to the farmers for the purchase of different kinds of farm machines like tractors, trailers, power tillers etc. These types of subsidy schemes are designed to benefit the poorer section of the working population who are the potential suppliers of child labour. It is therefore natural to expect that these fiscal measures will raise the earning opportunities of the poor households which in turn will lower the supply of child labour through positive income effect. However, the matter is not as straightforward as it appears to be at the first sight. Apart from their impact on adult wages, these fiscal policies affect the relative output compositions of the two agricultural sectors and the earning opportunities of children as well. Expansion/contraction of any form of agriculture at the cost of the other will affect the demand for child labour and therefore their price. An expansion of backward agriculture resulting from a price subsidy policy given to that sector, for example, will create more demand for child labour and raise the use of child labour in the economy. Even if there is a 3 See Basu an Van (1998) , Basu (1999) , Gupta (2000 Gupta ( , 2002 , Jaferey and Lahiri (2002 ), Ranjan (1999 , 2001 ), Baland and Robinson (2000) , Chaudhuri (2009) , Chaudhuri and Dwibedi (2006, 2007) , Dwibedi and Chaudhuri (2009) among others. In the literature the supply of child labour has been attributed to factors such as abject poverty, lack of educational facilities and poor quality of schooling, capital market imperfection, parental attitudes including the objectives to maximize present income etc.
positive income effect due to increase in adult wages, the net effect on child labour is ambiguous.
Any policy effect on the child labour incidence, therefore, should be carried out in a m ulti-sector general equilibrium framework to capture various linkages that may exist in the system.
The present paper is designed to examine the implications of two different types of subsidy policies to the agricultural sectors of an economy on the child labour incidence in a general equilibrium framework. We consider a three-sector full-employment model with child labour.
The economy is divided into two agricultural and one manufacturing sector s. One of the two agricultural sectors (sector 1) is the advanced agricultural sector that produces it output by means of adult labour, land and capital. The other agricultural sector, we call it backward agriculture (sector 2), also produces an agricultural commodity using adult labour, land and child labour.
Finally, sector 3 produces a manufacturing product with the help of adult labour and capital. In this setup we have examined the consequences of a credit subsidy policy to advanced agricultural sector and a price subsidy policy designed to benefit backward agriculture on the aggregate supply of child labour in the economy. We have found that a price subsidy policy to backward agricultural sector is likely to be counterproductive while a credit subsidy to advanced agriculture may be effective in lessening the prevalence of child labour in the economy. The paper, therefore, questions the desirability of assisting backward agriculture so as to eradicate the problem of child labour in the society. 
The model
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It is sensible to assume that the backward agricultural sector is more adult labour-intensive vis-à-vis the advanced agricultural sector with respect to land. This implies that Commodity 1 is chosen as the numeraire.
The following three equations present the zero-profit conditions relating to the three sectors of the economy.
where R , r and C W stand for return to land, return to capital and child wage rate, respectively. r S is the ad-valorem rate of credit subsidy 5 given to the advanced agricultural sector and P S stands for the rate of ad-valorem price subsidy given to backward agriculture.
Complete utilization of adult labour, capital, land and child labour imply the following four equations, respectively.
While endowments of adult labour, land and capital are fixed in the economy, the aggregate supply of child labour, C L , is endogenous and is determined from the utility maximizing behavior of the households.
Household behaviour
We derive the supply function of child labour from the utility maximizing behaviour of the representative altruistic poor household. There are L numbers of working families, which are classified into two groups with respect to the earnings of their adult members. The adult workers who work in the higher paid formal manufacturing sector comprise the richer section of the working population. On the contrary, labourers who are engaged in the informal agricultural sectors constitute the poorer section. There is now considerable evidence and theoretical reason for believing that, in developing countries, parents send their children to work out of sheer 5 It is easy to check that a price subsidy policy to advanced agriculture also produces the same effects.
poverty. Following the 'Luxury Axiom' 6 of Basu and Van (1998) , we assume that there exists a critical level of family (or adult labour) income, * W , such that the parents will send their children out to work if and only if the actual adult wage rate is less than this critical level. We assume that each worker in the formal manufacturing sector earns a wage income, W , sufficiently higher than this critical level 7 . So, the workers of the formal sector do not send their children to work. On the other hand, adult workers employed in the two agricultural sectors earn W amount of wage income, which is less than the critical wage , * W , and therefore send some of their children to the job market to supplement low family income.
The supply function of child labour by each poor working family is determined from the utility maximizing behaviour of the representative altruistic household who works in the agricultural sectors. We assume that each working family consists of one adult member and 'n' number of children. The altruistic adult member of the family (guardian) decides the number of children to be sent to the work place ( ) C l . The utility function of the household is given by )) ( , , , (
The household derives utility from the consumption of the three commodities, i C s and from the children's leisure. For analytical simplicity let us consider the following Cobb -Douglas type of the utility function.
It satisfies all the standard properties and it is homogeneous of degree 1.
6 Basu and Van (1998) have shown that if child labour and adult labour are substitutes (Substitution Axiom) and if child leisure is a luxury commodity to the poor households (Luxury Axiom), unfavourable adult labour market, responsible for low adult wage rate, is the driving force behind the incidence of child labour. According to the Luxury Axiom, there exists a critical level of adult wage rate, and any adult worker earning below this wage rate, considers himself as poor and does not have the luxury to send his offspring to schools. He is forced to send his children to the job market to supplement low family income out of sheer poverty. 7 We can also quantify this critical value in our model. From equation (10) we can say that
The household maximizes its utility subject to the following budget constraint. ) (
where, W is the income of the adult worker and C C l W measures the income from child labour.
Maximizing the utility function subject to the above budget constraint and solving for C l the following family child labour supply function can be derived.
From (10) it is easy to check that C l varies negatively with the adult wage rate, W . A rise in W produces a positive income effect so that the adult worker chooses more leisure for his children and therefore decides to send a lower number of children to the workplace. An increase in C W , on the other hand, produces a negative price effect, which increases the supply of child labour from each family. 
The General Equilibrium Analysis
Using (11), equation (7) can be rewritten as 2 2 3 3
The general equilibrium structure of the economy is represented by equations (1) -(6), (7.1) and (11). There are eight endogenous variables in the system: 9 It may be checked that the results of this paper hold for any utility function generating a supply function of child labour that satisfies these two properties.
9 eight independent equations (namely equations (1)  (6), (7.1) and (11). The parameters in the system are: 2 3 , , , , , , , , , , , r P P L K N W n S     and P S . Equations (1)  (3) constitute the price system. This is an indecomposable system with three price equations and four factor prices , , , C W W r and R . So factor prices depend on both commodity prices and factor endowments.
Given the child wage rate, sectors 1 and 2 together effectively form a modified Heckscher-Ohlin system as they use both adult unskilled labour and land in their production. Given the world prices and the unionised wage W , r is determined from equation (3). Now X are simultaneously obtained from equation (1), (2), (4) - (6) and (7.1). Finally, C L is determined from (11).
Comparative Statics
The two agricultural sectors receive subsidies from the government. The subsidy schemes are designed to benefit the poorer section of the working population who are the potential suppliers of child labour. The conventional wisdom is that these fiscal measures will raise the adult incomes of the poor households which in turn lower the supply of child labour through positive income effect. This section is aimed at examining the efficacies of the two subsidy policies in mitigating the child labour problem in the economy. Two different subsidies are given to the two agricultural sectors. The advanced agricultural sector receives a credit subsidy at the rate r S while the backward agricultural sector gets a price subsidy at the rate P S .
For determining the consequences of the subsidy policies on the child labour incidence after totally differentiating equation (1), (2), (4) - (6) Proposition 1 can be explained in economic terms in the following fashion. As r is determined from the zero profitability condition for sector 3 (equation (3)) and remains unchanged despite a change in r S and P S , sectors 1 and 2 together can effectively be regarded as a Modified
Hechscher-Ohlin subsystem (MHOSS).
The modification is due to the fact that those two sectors use adult labour and land, apart from the fact that sector 2 uses child labour and sector 1 uses capital as inputs. An increase in r S (which effectively implies an increase in the price of commodity 1) raises the rate of return to land, R and lowers the adult wage, W following a
Stolper-Samuelson effect, as sector 2 is more adult labour-intensive than sector 1 with respect to land. This generates a Rybczynski type effect and produces an expansionary (a contractionary) effect on sector 1 (sector 2). This is a well-known result in the theory of international trade that a
Stolper-Samuelson effect contains an element of Rybczynski effect if the technologies of
production are of the variable coefficient type. As sector 2 contracts the demand for child labour falls as this is specific to this sector. Consequently, the child wage rate falls. It is easy to check that the proportionate fall in child wage rate is greater than that in adult wage so composition. The supply of child labour by each poor working families rises and sector 3 contracts under the same sufficient as stated above.
Agricultural subsidy policies and incidence of child labour
For examining the implications of the subsidy policies on the incidence of child labour i n the economy we use the aggregate child labour supply function, which is given by equation (11). We note that any policy affects the supply of child labour in two ways: (i) through a change in the size of the informal sector adult labour force, 
S S S S 
. On the contrary, a price subsidy policy directed towards backward agriculture aggravates the child labour problem under anyone of the above two sufficient conditions.
As explained previously, a credit subsidy policy to advanced agriculture raises the ) / ( C W W ratio, which in turn lowers the supply of child labour from each poor working family.
On the other hand, as the formal sector expands the number of poor working families, which are considered to be the suppliers of child labour,
where there is less number of poor families each supplying less number on child labors. So the supply of child labour unambiguously falls. A price subsidy policy to backward agriculture produces exactly the opposite effects thereby raising the supply of child labour in the society.
Conclusion remarks
In a developing country the government often tinkers with market mechanism using its tax and subsidy policies for different purposes. It is a common belief that the backward agricultural sector should be subsidized as poorer group of the working population are employed in this sector who send their children out to work out of sheer poverty. If the economic conditions of these people can be improved the social menace of child could automatically be mitigated. The analysis of this paper has challenged this populist belief using a three-sector general equilibrium model with child labour and agricultural dualism. The advanced agriculture is distinguished from backward agriculture as follows. The former uses capital in the form of agricultural machineries that prevents child labour to work on these farms. On the contrary, backward agriculture uses primitive techniques of cultivation and employs child labour in a significant number. Apart from this, backward agriculture uses more labour-intensive (adult labour) technique vis-à-vis advanced agriculture with respect to land. In this backdrop we have examined the consequences of a credit subsidy policy to advanced agricultural sector and a price subsidy policy designed to benefit backward agriculture on the aggregate supply of child labour in the economy. We have found that a price subsidy policy to backward agricultural sector is likely to aggravate the child labour problem while a credit subsidy to advanced agriculture may be effective in reducing the gravity of the problem in the economy. The paper, therefore, questions the desirability of assisting backward agriculture so as to eradicate the problem of child labour in the society.
Maximizing equation (8) 
From (A.1) we get the following expressions.
Substitution of the values of 1
C and 3 C into the budget constraint and further simplifications give us the following child labour supply function of each poor working household.
Appendix II: Changes in factor prices
As r is determined from equation (3), it is independent of any changes in r S and P S . In other words, we have ˆ0.
r  Now we totally differentiate equations (1), (2), (4) - (6) and (7.1), collecting terms and arranging in a matrix notation we get the following expression. 
where, 
as we have assumed that the backward agricultural sector is more adult labour-intensive vis-à-vis the advanced agricultural sector with respect to land both in 
Using the expression of LL S we can further simplify the expression of ˆ( ) C W W  as follows. Using (A.9), from (A.6) -(A.8) and (A.10) we can obtain the following results. 
